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Vagueness, Inconsistency and Less 
Respect for Charter Rights of 
Accused at the Supreme  
Court in 2012-2013 
Don Stuart* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I have often lauded the Supreme Court of Canada for achieving a 
much better balance than politicians between the rights of accused and 
society’s interests in enforcing tough criminal laws. The Court’s recent 
record, however, gives cause for alarm respecting issues of undue vague-
ness and inconsistency, and shows diminishing resolve in protecting the 
Charter1 rights of accused. In this context the Court never speaks these 
days, as did Chief Justice Dickson, of courts being the “guardians of the 
Constitution.2 The Court has also conspicuously avoided even addressing 
some Charter issues important to accused. 
My main exhibits are the Court’s controversial rulings in Mabior,3 
Maybin,4 Prokofiew5 and Nedelcu,6 with A. (D.I.)7 and S. (N.)8 invoked in 
aid to show rampantly inconsistent approaches to judicial notice. 
                                                                                                             
* Faculty of Law, Queen’s University. Many of the views expressed in this paper first 
appeared in my writings in the Criminal Reports, published by Carswell Thomson Reuters. 
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.). The role was 
recently relied on by McLachlin C.J.C. in asserting Métis land rights in Manitoba Metis Federation 
Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] S.C.J. No. 13, 2013 SCC 13 (S.C.C.).  
3 R. v. Mabior, [2012] S.C.J. No. 47, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 584 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mabior”]. 
4 R. v. Maybin, [2012] S.C.J. No. 24, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Maybin”]. 
5 R. v. Prokofiew, [2012] S.C.J. No. 49, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 639 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Prokofiew”]. 
6 R. v. Nedelcu, [2012] S.C.J. No. 59, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 311 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nedelcu”]. 
7 R. v. A. (D.I.), [2012] S.C.J. No. 5, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 149 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “A. (D.I.)”]. 
8 R. v. S. (N.), [2012] S.C.J. No. 72, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 726 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “S. (N.)”]. 
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II. R. V. MABIOR (HIV DISCLOSURE)9 
This carefully justified unanimous decision achieves a compromise 
built on refining the majority decision of Cory J. in R. v. Cuerrier10 that 
fraud will only vitiate consent under section 265(3) of the Criminal Code11 
in cases of assault and sexual assault where the fraud involves a significant 
risk of serious harm. The Court has again sensibly rejected the approach of 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Cuerrier that any fraud to induce consent will result 
in criminality. So proven lies such as “I love you”, “Trust me”, “I will be 
faithful” or “I will buy you a fur coat” (the extravagant example that en-
gaged the Court in Cuerrier) will not result in criminal sanctions. In 
Mabior, the Chief Justice decided that consent to sexual intercourse with 
an HIV-positive accused will be not be vitiated by the fraud of non-
disclosure where there is no realistic possibility of transmission of HIV 
because of a low viral count AND a condom was used. The first obvious 
vagueness in the approach is that there is no definition provided of what 
constitutes a low viral count, which will clearly therefore require expert 
testimony in every case, a situation the Court expressly sought to avoid.  
The Mabior ruling has already lead to strident criticism in the media 
from two very different interest groups. Those who see HIV-positive 
persons as a vulnerable and marginalized group cannot see why non-
disclosure of HIV status where there is a low viral count should result in 
serious criminality given that anti-retroviral treatment results in an 89 per 
cent to 96 per cent reduction in the general low risk of HIV transmission 
for one sexual act of 1 in 1,250.12 These advocates argue that any forced 
disclosure of HIV status will discourage HIV testing and inhibit sexual 
autonomy inherent in truthful but inhibiting disclosures such as “I am 
HIV-positive but the risk of transmission is low so the risk is very small.” 
It is also not clear to these critics why the Court decided that the only 
way an HIV-positive individual engaging in sexual activity can avoid 
serious criminality for non-disclosure of a low viral count is to wear a 
condom. In contrast, the Manitoba Court of Appeal’s approach in the court 
below to the anti-retroviral advances was not to criminalize non-disclosure 
of a low viral count OR any case of non-disclosure where a condom was 
                                                                                                             
9 Compare the more favourable comment by Janine Benedet, “Fraud Vitiating Consent to 
Sexual Activity after Mabior and C. (D.)” (2012) 96 C.R. (6th) 33. 
10 [1998] S.C.J. No. 64, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cuerrier”]. 
11 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
12 See data referred to at paras. 97, 100 and 101 of Mabior, supra, note 3. 
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used. So the Supreme Court is much tougher and broader in its approach to 
criminalization. 
A different criticism is advanced by advocates for sexual assault 
complainants. Since the approach to consent has long been established as 
subjective, surely, it is argued, the serious life-threatening risk of HIV 
transmission, however low, should always be disclosed to allow for in-
formed consent. It is clear that in most of the HIV cases before the 
courts, the complainants have testified that they would never have con-
sented had they known about the HIV status. These advocates would no 
doubt welcome the 80 per cent risk reduction promised by the Supreme 
Court’s requirement that condoms always be used.13 
The vehemence and strength of the arguments from these opposed 
camps suggest that the Supreme Court had to arrive at a compromise on 
the present state of medical knowledge and that it could not satisfy all 
competing concerns. Yet the language the Court uses is glaringly inconsis-
tent with its conclusions. Chief Justice McLachlin, undoubtedly our most 
powerful and prolific Chief Justice in Canadian history, is eloquent in justi-
fying the Court’s approach. She relies on the rule of law requirement of 
clear notice of criminality (“Condemning people for conduct that they 
could not have reasonably known was criminal is Kafkaesque and anath-
ema to our notions of justice”14), on the need to avoid criminal laws being 
too broad and on Charter values of “equality, autonomy, liberty, privacy 
and human dignity”.15 However, it is hard to see how any of these notions 
pointed to the broad criminalizing solution the Court actually adopted.  
The current rhetoric of Charter values (“Charter lite” would be a bet-
ter term) is particularly disquieting if one believes in the rule of law. This 
“Charter values” rather than “rights” discourse is growing increasingly 
unruly and apparently does not include the presumption of innocence and 
fair trial values. These “Charter lite” assertions bypass the rigour of actu-
ally meeting established tests for Charter breaches. In the case of equality 
rights, after anxious debate16 the majority of the Court has determined 
that the controlling test of discrimination to establish a section 15 breach 
does NOT involve having to point to an effect on dignity. So why is 
“dignity” relevant to Charter “values”? 
                                                                                                             
13 Id., at para. 98. 
14 Id., at para. 14 
15 Id., at para. 45.  
16 Quebec (Attorney General) v. A., [2013] S.C.J. No. 5, 2013 SCC 5 (S.C.C.). 
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These broad principles of no retrospectivity, avoiding broad criminal 
sanctions and Charter values were also not addressed in the ruling of the 
Chief Justice for the 6-3 majority in R. v. A. (J.)17 that advance consent to 
sexual conduct while unconscious is not a valid consent in law. The un-
contradicted evidence in that case was that the adult complainant freely 
and consciously consented to erotic asphyxiation involving anal penetra-
tion during transitory unconsciousness.  
III. R. V. MAYBIN (INTERVENING CAUSE)18 
Maybin is the first Supreme Court case to fully confront the issue of 
how courts should decide whether an intervening cause breaks the chain 
of causation in the case of offences where an element to be proved is the 
causing of a consequence. The end result is that the Court widens the 
approach to causation and the already excessively wide net of man-
slaughter.19 In my view, it was unwise to leave the test of intervening 
cause untethered. 
In the court below, the B.C. Court of Appeal divided on whether the 
test for intervening cause breaking the chain of causation should be that 
of no reasonable forseeability or whether there was an intentional act of 
an independent actor. It was expected that the Supreme Court would 
adopt one of these or another approach. Instead, the Supreme Court 
decided that neither test is to be preferred and that both are merely 
analytical aids and do not alter the Smithers/Nette test of whether the 
accused was a “significant contributing cause” of the victim’s death. 
In focusing on the language of “significant contributing cause” 
the Supreme Court glosses over the complexity of R. v. Nette,20 where 
Arbour J. for the 5-4 majority preferred the language of significant 
contributing cause but indicated that terminology was up to the trial 
judge, leaving it open for resort to the language in R. v. Smithers21 of a 
contributing test outside the de minimis range. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé 
for the minority on the law in Nette objected to the “significant” 
                                                                                                             
17 [2011] S.C.J. No. 28, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 440 (S.C.C.). 
18 See critical comments by Ben Snow, “A Cause for Concern: Incoherence in the Doctrine 
of Intervening Cause” (2012) 92 C.R. (6th) 241 [hereinafter “Snow”] and Gerry Ferguson, 
“Causation and the Mens Rea for Manslaughter: A Lethal Combination” (2013) 99 C.R. (6th) 351 
[hereinafter “Ferguson”]. 
19 See Ferguson, id., for a careful analysis of why our manslaughter law is far too wide. 
20 [2001] S.C.J. No. 75, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 488 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nette”]. 
21 [1977] S.C.J. No. 58, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 506 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Smithers”].  
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adjective as unnecessarily narrowing the Smithers test. The Court in 
Maybin ought to have made it crystal clear that it was opting for the test 
of the significant contributing test, as did Doherty J.A. in R. v. Talbot.22 
Arguably, the Court should have rested content with the test for all cause 
issues and not have gotten mired in issues of intervening cause. 
The Court, however, went further. In doing so, it is unfortunate that 
the Court in Maybin did not adopt a binding test for when a cause is in-
tervening to break the chain of causation. “Analytical aids” that are 
helpful but not determinative leave trial counsel and trial judges at sea. 
The same ambiguity arises in the jurisprudential approach in R. v. Stone23 
identifying three non-determinative factors for distinguishing the sane 
automatism defence from a finding of not criminally responsible on ac-
count of mental disorder. 
In Nette Arbour J. said that it was not necessary to address the factual 
and legal cause issues separately, but this is what the Court does in Maybin. 
Yet neither the reasonable foreseeable nor independent actor test is to be 
determinative on the issue of legal causation. Explain that to a jury or to 
law students! 
The Court furthermore toughens the reasonable foreseeable approach 
to one of reasonable foreseeability of a risk rather than of the particular 
intervention.24  Here, reasonable foresight of someone intervening to beat 
up the victim sufficed to hold the original actor criminally responsible for 
the death. With Finch C.J.B.C. in dissent in the court below, this is hard 
to find on the evidence before the Court. The Court notes that this 
approach is consistent with the fault requirement for unlawful act 
manslaughter — reasonable foresight of non-trivial bodily harm adopted 
in R. v. Creighton.25 It is not clear how this analysis will work in non-
homicide cases where subjective mens rea is required. Presumably in 
murder cases these intervening act cases will be resolved not on Maybin 
but on the Charter mens rea requirement of actual foresight of the 
likelihood of death established in R. v. Martineau.26 
                                                                                                             
22 [2007] O.J. No. 427, 44 C.R. (6th) 176 (Ont. C.A.).  
23 [1999] S.C.J. No. 27, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290 (S.C.C.). 
24 See Snow, supra, note 18. 
25 [1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
26 [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.). 
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The independent act approach is also pragmatically changed to one 
where this does not absolve the accused where the act of another was a 
direct result of the accused’s act.27 How is this to apply to more difficult 
cases such as where the victim of a minor assault is taken by ambulance 
to hospital for a precautionary check and death is caused by dangerous 
driving of the ambulance driver, bad treatment by an intervening good 
Samaritan or negligent medical treatment at the hospital? The Court 
points to existing Criminal Code provisions declaring that some of these 
intervening causes do not break the chain of causation (for example, 
section 225 respecting improper treatment applied in “good faith”). 
The Court does not address whether fundamental principles of justice 
under section 7 of the Charter should be applied to prevent such clearly 
excessive extensions of the law of manslaughter. In Nette, Arbour J. 
referred to legal causation reflecting “fundamental principles of criminal 
justice such as the principle that the morally innocent should not be 
punished”.28 Hopefully this is not the last word on intervening cause and 
prosecutorial discretion will be exercised with restraint where multiple 
causes are at play in cases more sympathetic than Maybin. 
IV. CHARTER AVERSE 
In some cases the current Supreme Court is conspicuously ducking 
rather than guarding Charter standards. 
In R. v. Ryan29 the Court indicated that it was not the role of the 
Court to fill gaps in what Parliament has done — in that case in its codi-
fication of the defence of self-defence. The Court overlooks that in 
R. v. Ruzic30 it held that defences required no more deference to Charter 
scrutiny that when reviewing fault requirements and further declared that 
moral involuntariness was a Charter standard under section 7. How that 
plays out for abused persons who act in agonizing situations was regret-
tably left unaddressed in Ryan.  
In R. v. Bouchard-Lebrun,31 involving toxic psychosis induced by 
drugs, the Supreme Court rejected the defence of extreme intoxication to 
                                                                                                             
27 See Snow, supra, note 18. 
28 Nette, supra, note 20, at para. 45, quoted in Maybin, supra, note 4, at para. 16.  
29 [2013] S.C.J. No. 3, 2013 SCC 3 (S.C.C.). See Criminal Reports comments by Stephen 
Coughlan, Archie Kaiser, and Carissima Mathen and Michael Plaxton. 
30 [2001] S.C.J. No. 25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687 (S.C.C.). 
31 [2011] S.C.J. No. 58, 2011 SCC 58 (S.C.C.). 
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a charge of aggravated assault by simply applying section 33.1 of the 
Criminal Code. In enacting section 33.1 Parliament purported to remove 
the Court’s R. v. Daviault32 defence of extreme intoxication “akin to 
insanity or automatism” from offences of general intent which affect 
bodily integrity. The Court in Bouchard-Lebrun simply noted the lack of 
Charter challenge. Since the Court’s majority decision in Daviault was 
squarely based on the view that this limited and rare defence was 
required by the Charter, it seems far too deferential and meek for the 
Court to have avoided the Charter issue in this way. The Court should 
have ordered a new hearing to decide whether the Court is still 
committed to the Daviault principles it declared 15 years ago. 
I turn now to consider the Charter rulings in Prokofiew and Nedelcu. 
Both the key majority judgments were written by Justice Michael 
Moldaver. Justice Moldaver is certainly to be commended for his hard 
work since his appointment in already producing many judgments for the 
Court in the field of criminal law. He brings considerable criminal law 
expertise and experience to the Court but he has never been known as a 
Charter enthusiast.33 In these two Charter judgments he has left too much 
to the discretion of trial judges and has unnecessarily diminished Charter 
rights for accused. Both judgments unfortunately necessitate careful 
parsing and analysis to reveal their reality.  
V. R. V. PROKOFIEW34 (COMMENTS ON THE ACCUSED’S  
SILENCE AT TRIAL) 
Section 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act35 has long provided that 
“[t]he failure of the person charged, or of the wife or husband of that 
person, to testify shall not be made the subject of comment by the judge 
or by counsel for the prosecution”. 
The Supreme Court’s divided majority opinion in Prokofiew has read 
down section 4(6) to allow instructions on trial silence, but has left this to 
the largely unfettered discretion of trial judges. This has further and 
unnecessarily weakened the right to silence. 
                                                                                                             
32 [1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Daviault”]. 
33 See Michael Moldaver, “Long Criminal Trials: Masters of a System They Are Meant to 
Serve” (2006) 32 C.R. (6th) 316 and my reply, “The Charter is a Living Tree Not a Weed to be 
Stunted – Justice Moldaver Has Overstated” (2006) 40 C.R. (6th) 280. 
34 Supra, note 5. 
35 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5. 
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1. The Courts Below 
The trial judge, relying on dicta of Sopinka J. for the Supreme Court 
in R. v. Crawford36 and R. v. Noble,37 concluded that section 4(6) of the 
Canada Evidence Act prohibited him from telling the jury that they could 
not use the accused’s silence at trial as evidence against him. The trial 
judge made it clear that, but for his understanding of the prohibition in 
section 4(6), he would have given a remedial instruction. The jury con-
victed the appellant and his co-accused. The accused appealed, inter alia, 
arguing that section 4(6) was unconstitutional. 
The appeal was dismissed by Doherty J.A. on behalf of a unanimous 
five-person panel of the Ontario Court of Appeal.38 Justices Feldman, 
MacPherson, Blair and Juriansz concurred. The court held that Sopinka J.’s 
comments were obiter and should not be followed given earlier pro-
nouncements from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had held that 
section 4(6) did not preclude comments not prejudicial to the accused 
and permitted a trial judge to tell a jury that an accused who does not 
testify is exercising his or her constitutional right and that no adverse 
inference can be drawn from that failure to testify. However, the Court of 
Appeal held, on consideration of the entirety of the instructions on the 
presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt, that this was a case for 
the curative proviso under section 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code. 
The jury would have to understand that guilt had to be established on the 
evidence and that the accused’s silence at trial could not be used to infer 
the accused’s guilt.  
2. The Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The 5-4 division in the 
Supreme Court is importantly not just over the application of the curative 
proviso. The majority agreed with the Ontario Court of Appeal that this 
was a case for the curative proviso. The minority judgment of Fish J. 
reads as if he thought he was writing for a majority. This seems 
apparent from the enigmatic and opaque opening paragraphs of the 
majority judgment of Moldaver J. (Deschamps, Abella, Rothstein and 
Karakatsanis JJ. concurring) as follows:  
                                                                                                             
36 [1995] S.C.J. No. 30, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 858 (S.C.C.). 
37 [1997] S.C.J. No. 40, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 874 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Noble”]. 
38 [2010] O.J. No. 2498, 100 O.R. (3d) 401 (Ont. C.A.).  
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Largely for the reasons given by Doherty J.A., I would dismiss 
Mr. Prokofiew’s further appeal to this Court. I have had the benefit of 
reading the reasons of my colleague Justice Fish and I agree with much 
of his analysis. Where I disagree with him is in the result. I will explain 
our disagreement and why the appeal should be dismissed, but before 
doing so, I will address the matters on which my colleague and I agree 
— albeit with some additional observations.39 
Although it is the majority judgment that is binding on how judges 
are to proceed in future cases, in order to understand what the Court 
decided it will be helpful to first consider what Fish J. decided on 
section 4(6) and the right to silence.  
3. Minority in the Result 
According to Fish J. (McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel and Cromwell JJ. 
concurring), the Court of Appeal for Ontario correctly held that section 4(6) 
prohibits comments prejudicial to the accused but not the remedial in-
struction requested by defence counsel and contemplated by the judge. 
Dicta to the contrary by Sopinka J. were indeed obiter and should not be 
followed given earlier Supreme Court judgments. 
Noble had established that a trier of fact may not draw an adverse in-
ference from the accused’s failure to testify and that the accused’s silence 
at trial may not be treated as evidence of guilt. To do so would violate the 
presumption of innocence and the right to silence. It would to that extent 
and for that reason shift the burden of proof to the accused, turning the 
accused’s constitutional right to silence into a “snare and a delusion”.40 
The Crown had argued that Noble should be overruled but Fish J. held 
that there was no persuasive reason to do so. In his view Noble is a recent 
and important precedent regarding a fundamental constitutional princi-
ple; the decision was constitutionally mandated and had not proven 
unworkable in practice. Nothing of significance had occurred since 1997 
to cause the Court to reconsider its decision. On the issue of directions in 
jury trials, the minority offered the following advice: 
In short, s. 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act does not prohibit an 
affirmation by the trial judge of the accused’s right to silence. And, in 
appropriate circumstances, an instruction that no adverse inference may 
                                                                                                             
39 Prokofiew, supra, note 5, at paras. 1-2. 
40 Noble, supra, note 37, at para. 72.  
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be drawn from the silence of the accused at trial is not a prohibited 
“comment” on the accused’s failure to testify within the meaning of 
that provision.41 
Trial judges must take care to ensure that the right to silence becomes 
neither a snare nor a delusion (Noble, at para. 72). To this end, 
whenever there is a “significant risk” ― as the trial judge found in this 
case ― that the jury will otherwise treat the silence of the accused as 
evidence of guilt, an appropriate remedial direction ought to be given to 
the jury. That was not done here.42 
Justice Fish concluded that the trial judge erred in law in this case in fail-
ing to give the jury the remedial instruction requested by defence counsel 
and there was also a conceded error in admitting hearsay evidence. The 
Crown had not discharged its burden on the curative proviso. This opin-
ion on the curative proviso did not carry the Court. 
4. Majority Decision 
According to Moldaver J. for the majority, the Court was in agree-
ment that section 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act does not prohibit a 
trial judge from affirming an accused’s right to silence. More specifi-
cally, the majority added the following remarks: 
In so concluding, I should not be taken — nor do I understand my 
colleague to suggest — that such an instruction must be given in every 
case where an accused exercises his or her right to remain silent at trial. 
Rather, it will be for the trial judge, in the exercise of his or her 
discretion, to provide such an instruction where there is a realistic 
concern that the jury may place evidential value on an accused’s 
decision not to testify.43 
In cases where the jury is given an instruction on the accused’s right to 
remain silent at trial, the trial judge should, in explaining the right, 
make it clear to the jury that an accused’s silence is not evidence and 
that it cannot be used as a makeweight for the Crown in deciding 
whether the Crown has proved its case. In other words, if, after 
considering the whole of the evidence, the jury is not satisfied that the 
charge against the accused has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 
                                                                                                             
41 Id., at para. 79. 
42 Id., at para. 94. 
43 Id., at para. 3 (emphasis added). 
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the jury cannot look to the accused’s silence to remove that doubt and 
give the Crown’s case the boost it needs to push it over the line.44 
This case provided an example, the majority held, of a situation 
where such an instruction would be warranted — a cutthroat defence 
case where one accused testifies and points the finger at the other, while 
the other exercises his right not to testify. In such cases where there is a 
risk of counsel misleading the jury on a co-accused’s right to remain 
silent at trial, trial judges would, held Moldaver J., do well to spell out 
the governing principles and ensure that counsel’s remarks conform to 
those principles. In this case remedial instruction would have been pref-
erable. However, considering the instructions on the presumption of 
reasonable doubt, this was a case for the curative proviso. 
Justice Moldaver adds that it might be helpful to explain how a jury 
may use a lack of contradictory evidence in deciding whether the Crown 
has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt: 
Juries are also told that in deciding whether the Crown has proved its 
case to the criminal standard, they are to look to the whole of the 
evidence — and, having done so, they may only convict if they are 
satisfied, on the basis of evidence they find to be both credible and 
reliable, that the Crown has established the accused’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In coming to that conclusion, a jury may not use an 
accused’s silence at trial as evidence, much less evidence of guilt, and, 
where appropriate, the jury should be so instructed.45 
That said, in assessing the credibility and reliability of evidence upon 
which the Crown can and does rely, a jury is entitled to take into 
account, among other things, the fact that the evidence stands 
uncontradicted, if that is the case — and the jury may be so instructed. 
Of course, the fact that evidence is uncontradicted does not mean that 
the jury must accept it, and an instruction to that effect should be given.46 
5. Comment 
The Supreme Court’s judgments do not give clear guidance to trial 
judges. It is at least made clear that the majority view in Noble has been 
re-asserted. It is a fundamental constitutional principle that no adverse 
inference can be drawn from trial silence.  
                                                                                                             
44 Id., at para. 4. 
45 Id., at para 10. 
46 Id., at para 11 (emphasis added). 
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The Court has also read down section 4(6) to make it clear that in-
structions can be given to juries on this Charter principle. It was a stretch 
for the Supreme Court to decide that a clearly worded statutory prohibi-
tion against “comment” does not mean what it says and permits 
comments not prejudicial to accused. The Supreme Court ought to have 
been forthright and declared section 4(6) unconstitutional.  
What is distressingly unclear is when instructions should be given. 
The only clear pronouncement from either judgment is that there must 
be a direction in cutthroat defence cases like Prokofiew when defence 
counsel is making hay of the silence of a co-accused. But more 
generally, the majority say that an express direction is only required 
when “there is a realistic concern that a jury may place evidential value 
on the accused’s decision not to testify”.47 How is a trial judge to 
determine that? Furthermore, the majority determines that a trial judge 
can instruct the jury that the Crown evidence is uncontradicted, coupled 
with the instruction that this does not mean that the jury must accept it. 
That would allow an indirect and perhaps not-so-subtle comment on the 
fact that an accused did not testify. Would it be appropriate where 
Crown witnesses have been vigorously and effectively cross-examined? 
Either of these possible instructions is now left to the largely unfettered 
discretion of trial judges.  
We need to avoid any inkling of the 1840 theft trial at the Old Bailey 
where the trial lasted about three minutes and the jury direction was, 
“Gentlemen, I suppose you have no doubt. I have none.”48 
The Supreme Court has again acknowledged the fundamental right to 
silence but given it no teeth.49 Opinions do differ as to the determination 
that no adverse inference can be drawn from trial silence. Recall that it 
was Chief Justice Lamer who lead the dissent in Noble. He expressed the 
view that where there is overwhelming evidence and the accused stays 
silent at trial, an adverse inference can be drawn. But once the current 
Supreme Court adopted the majority position on Noble it should, in my 
view, have required a direction to the jury as to that right in every case. 
Of course some judges may now wish to take that position since the mat-
ter has been left to unfettered discretion. On the other hand, given the 
application of the proviso in Prokofiew it is very difficult to assess when 
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49 See especially R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405 (S.C.C.) (s. 7 right 
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appeal courts should reverse a trial judge who gave no instruction on the 
right to silence, even in cutthroat defence cases. 
VI. R. V. NEDELCU50 (USE IMMUNITY) 
In essence the full Court first confirms the basic ruling of Binnie J. 
for a unanimous Court in R. v. Henry51 that use immunity under section 13 
of the Charter only applies where an accused gave incriminating evi-
dence under compulsion at a prior proceeding. However, Moldaver J. for 
a 6-3 majority held that the trial judge had not erred in permitting the 
Crown to cross-examine the accused on civil discovery statements be-
cause the statements were not incriminating, as “incriminating evidence” 
only refers to evidence the Crown could (if permitted) use in subsequent 
proceeding to prove or assist in proving one or more essential elements 
of the offence charged.  
This effectively reversed the clear bright line approach under Henry 
that previously compelled testimony is always inadmissible even if 
tendered for credibility, a pragmatic decision widely applauded by judges 
and commentators. 
1.  The Lower Courts  
The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing bodily 
harm and impaired driving causing bodily harm. He took a fellow em-
ployee, P, for a motorcycle ride on company property. There was a crash. P 
was not wearing a helmet and suffered permanent brain damage. The 
victim and his family brought a civil suit against the accused and he was 
examined for discovery. In his discovery answers on oath, the accused 
indicated that he had no memory of the accident until he woke up the 
next day in hospital. At the criminal trial 14 months later, he gave a de-
tailed account of how the accident occurred. The trial judge allowed the 
Crown to cross-examine on the statement as to credibility on the basis 
that section 13 of the Charter did not apply to compelled discovery evi-
dence in a civil case. The accused was not afforded the protection of 
section 13 of the Charter because his situation did not meet the quid pro 
                                                                                                             
50 Supra, note 6. See also the comments of Paul Calarco, “R. v. Nedelcu: Whatever Happened 
to a Large and Liberal Interpretation of the Charter?” (2013) 96 C.R. (6th) 438 and Lisa Dufraimont, 
“Section 13 Use Immunity After R. v. Nedlecu” (2013) 96 C.R. (6th) 431 [hereinafter “Dufraimont”]. 
51 [2005] S.C.J. No. 76. [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Henry”]. 
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quo rationale of compulsion. The accused had given his discovery evi-
dence to further his own private interest in a civil action against him. 
Relying in part on the contradictions between the accused’s two ac-
counts, the trial judge concluded that the accused’s entire testimony 
regarding the accident was unreliable. The accused was convicted and 
appealed. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the convic-
tion and ordered a new trial. The court, relying on Henry, held that under 
section 13 of the Charter an accused’s compelled testimony on civil dis-
covery is inadmissible at the subsequent criminal trial for purposes of 
incrimination or for testing credibility. The protection was not only avail-
able where the prior testimony assists the Crown. The accused had been 
compelled to testify on the examination for discovery solely for the bene-
fit of the plaintiffs. Quid pro quo had a wider meaning than that given by 
the trial judge. Any other proceeding in section 13 included royal com-
missions, statutory boards and tribunals, bankruptcy proceedings and 
other forms of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. The trial judge’s 
distinction between criminal and non-criminal interrogatories was not 
relevant. 
2. The Supreme Court 
The majority of the Supreme Court allowed the Crown appeal, set 
aside the order for a new trial and restored the conviction. 
According to Moldaver J. (McLachlin C.J.C., Deschamps, Abella, 
Rothstein and Karakatsanis JJ., concurring) section 13 of the Charter 
embodies a quid pro quo: a witness who has given incriminating evi-
dence under compulsion at a prior proceeding (the quid) is protected 
from having that evidence used to incriminate him or her at a subsequent 
proceeding (the quo), except in a prosecution for perjury or the giving of 
contradictory evidence. Consequently, a party seeking to invoke section 13 
protection must first establish that he or she provided “incriminating evi-
dence” under compulsion at a prior proceeding. In this context 
“incriminating evidence” means evidence that the Crown could use in a 
subsequent proceeding, if it were permitted to do so, to prove or assist in 
proving one or more of the essential elements of the offence charged. 
The time to determine whether the evidence given at a prior proceeding 
should be characterized as “incriminating” is when the Crown seeks to 
use the evidence at a subsequent hearing.  
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On its own, held Moldaver J., the accused’s discovery evidence indi-
cating that he remembered nothing from the accident could not have 
been used by the Crown to prove or assist in proving one or more of the 
essential elements of the criminal charges he was facing. It was therefore 
not incriminating evidence and did not trigger the protection of section 13. 
In theory, if the Crown were able to prove that the accused concocted his 
discovery evidence, that finding would constitute evidence of conscious-
ness of guilt from which guilt could potentially be inferred. However, the 
mere possibility that otherwise non-incriminating evidence could be con-
verted into incriminating evidence if the Crown took added steps was not 
enough to trigger the application of section 13. Moreover, the use of the 
accused’s discovery evidence to test his credibility, and nothing else, 
could not convert his discovery evidence into incriminating evidence. 
Where evidence of an accused’s non-incriminating prior testimony is 
introduced by the Crown, trial judges must provide juries with clear in-
structions on the use they can make of the evidence given at the prior 
proceeding. In this case, unless the accused adopted his discovery testi-
mony, the jury would be told that they could not use his discovery 
evidence for its truth, but only to test his credibility. The jury would also 
be told that if they were to reject the accused’s trial evidence, they could 
not use that rejection to bolster the Crown’s case but would simply re-
move his evidence from their consideration. 
Justice Moldaver suggests that trial judges will have little trouble 
discerning whether evidence given by the accused as a witness in a prior 
proceeding is incriminating. Where the evidence is found to be incrimi-
nating, section 13 will apply and the evidence will be inadmissible for 
any purpose (other than a prosecution for perjury or giving contradictory 
evidence). 
Justice LeBel, with Fish and Cromwell JJ. concurring, dissented in 
part. Cross-examination of the accused on his evidence given in civil 
discovery infringed his right against self-incrimination and should be 
excluded.  
Justice LeBel spoke for the whole Court in holding that a witness 
who is statutorily compellable is “compelled” to testify for the purposes 
of section 13. Whereas evidence from an accused who decides to testify 
is voluntary because the accused has a constitutional right not to testify, 
evidence from any other witness is not voluntary in the same sense even 
if the witness decides to testify on his or her own volition. In this case, 
the accused was statutorily compellable to give evidence on examination 
for discovery and therefore his evidence was compelled. Whether the 
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accused freely decided to attend the discovery proceeding was irrelevant 
to this conclusion.  
However, in dissent, LeBel J. held that the distinction between using 
prior compelled testimony to impeach credibility and using it to incrimi-
nate the accused was unworkable and that there can be no such 
distinction in practice in the context of section 13. The distinction was 
abandoned in the recent, unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in 
R. v. Henry and it should not be reintroduced. It was true that section 13 
sometimes operates to protect accused persons from impeachment by 
their prior testimony even when they have given conflicting testimony or 
there is evidence that they have lied under oath. Laying criminal charges 
for perjury was the appropriate way to deal with witnesses who tailor 
their evidence to suit their needs in each particular proceeding. 
The majority’s approach to section 13 would require courts to con-
duct voir dires to determine whether the statements of an accused are 
“innocent” or “incriminating”, which will encumber the trial process and 
render section 13 dubious in theory and uncertain in practice. Uncer-
tainty about how evidence might be used in future proceedings would 
discourage witness candour and reduce the scope of section 13 protection 
for previously compelled witnesses. 
3. Comment 
The new Nedelcu definition of incrimination for section 13 protec-
tion turning on the nature rather than the use of the evidence seems 
contrived and unstable. If the Crown is introducing evidence as in 
Nedelcu that the accused previously said he remembered nothing and 
now he remembers everything in detail, the purpose is, of course, to cast 
doubt on credibility and indirectly to admit the evidence to incriminate. 
The unanimous Court in Henry may not have expressly ruled on this is-
sue52 but Binnie J. clearly stated that the distinction between evidence 
that incriminated and evidence that went to credibility had proved diffi-
cult to draw in this context and should be avoided. This position was 
reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s decision long ago in R. v. Piché53 that 
it was wise to avoid any attempt to distinguish between inculpatory and 
exculpatory statements for the purposes of the voluntary confession rule. 
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Given Nedelcu, it is to say the least ironic that McLachlin C.J.C. for 
the Court in Sriskandarajah v. United States of America; Nadarajah v. 
United States of America54 relies on Henry for only rejecting prior prece-
dent in exceptional cases. The Court was not prepared to change its 
previous jurisprudence on extradition. The Court held that extradition does 
not violate the right of citizens to remain in Canada under section 6(1) of 
the Charter, even when the foreign state’s claim of jurisdiction is weak or 
when there is a realistic possibility of prosecuting in Canada. To hold 
otherwise would amount to overruling three previous decisions of the 
Court. The Court, said the Chief Justice, does not lightly depart from the 
law set out in the precedents:  
Adherence to precedent has long animated the common law. … It is an 
established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points 
come again in litigation. … The rule of precedent, or stare decisis, 
promotes predictability, reduces arbitrariness, and enhances fairness, by 
treating like cases alike. Exceptionally, this Court had recognized that it 
may depart from its prior decisions if there are compelling reasons to 
do so: R. v. Henry. … The benefits must outweigh the costs. For 
instance, compelling reasons will be found when a precedent has 
become unworkable, when its validity has been undermined by 
subsequent jurisprudence or when it has been decided on the basis of 
considerations that are no longer relevant.55  
There was no such justification offered in Nedelcu for departing from 
Henry. As the minority pointed out, the majority provide no compelling 
reasons for reversing that recent bright line decision widely supported by 
judges and commentators.  
The courts will now be faced with difficult section 13 voir dires try-
ing to apply the Nedelcu distinction. The guarantee against use immunity 
has been substantially weakened. 
There now appears to be more protection available in invoking the 
protection of section 5(2)) of the Canada Evidence Act. However, the 
witness and/or counsel will have to know enough to assert this protec-
tion. It is not automatic as was section 13 of the Charter as interpreted in 
Henry. 
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VII. JUDICIAL NOTICE 
R. v. Spence56 should be the controlling authority on judicial notice. 
Justice Binnie for a unanimous Court, including McLachlin C.J.C., was 
at pains to establish principles upon which all issues of judicial notice are 
to be based. The Court is cautious. The closer any matter is to the dispo-
sitive fact, the less scope there is to be for judicial notice. If the matter 
relates to adjudicative issues the strict Morgan “gold standard” set out by 
McLachlin C.J.C. in R. v. Find57 is to be applied. For judicial notice the 
facts have to be “(1) so notorious or generally accepted as not to be the 
subject of debate among reasonable people; or (2) capable of immediate 
and accurate demonstration by resort to readily accessible sources of in-
disputable accuracy”.58  
When it comes to social or legislative facts the Court opens the door 
a little wider. However, a judge must still ask whether the alleged fact 
would be accepted by a reasonably informed reasonable person as not 
subject to reasonable dispute. Justice Binnie expresses a preference for 
social science evidence to be presented by experts subject to cross-
examination. 
In R. v. A. (D.I.)59 the Court was interpreting the competency provi-
sion in section 16 of the Canada Evidence Act which allows adult 
witnesses with a low mental age to testify if they cannot understand an 
oath or solemn affirmation but can communicate and if they promise to 
tell the truth. The Chief Justice for the majority decided that there is to be 
no abstract inquiry into the person’s understanding of truth or the nature 
of a promise. The majority applies the empirical research and recom-
mendations of Professor Nick Bala respecting competency hearings for 
young children which had directly resulted in Parliament enacting a new 
and separate section 16.1 of the Canada Evidence Act. The majority 
chose not to address Binnie J.’s strong and detailed dissenting complaint 
in A. (D.I.) that this completely ignored judicial notice tests. There was 
indeed no evidence before the Court of any research involving mentally 
challenged adults. 
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In contrast, in R. v. S. (N.)60 McLachlin C.J.C., again speaking for 
the majority, confronted the issue of whether a complainant in a sexual 
assault trial should be required to remove her niqab (Muslim veil) for 
cross-examination. She refuses to consider social science evidence of 
interveners that cast doubt on whether assessing demeanour is a reliable 
way to assess credibility. The Chief Justice is blunt and dismissive: 
The only evidence in the record is a four-page unpublished review 
article suggesting that untrained individuals cannot accurately detect 
lies based on the speaker’s facial cues. This material was not tendered 
through an expert available for cross-examination, Intervenors have 
submitted articles for or against a connection, but they are not part of 
the record and not supported by expert witnesses, and so are more 
rhetorical than factual.61  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
It is a tall order to expect a Court of nine hard-working and expert 
jurists with a mind-boggling docket to always achieve consensus, clarity 
and consistency. These recent decisions, however, raise concerns that go 
to the legitimacy of the rule of law. And there are few signs that the 
Supreme Court is properly protecting the Charter rights of accused.
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